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I ntr oducti on
The Chinese party-state’s switch to market incentivesand competition-based compensation, while con-tributing mightily to the nation’s modernity, has at
the same time been at the very root of China’s new urban
poverty. Official concession that this is the case has some-
times been articulated quite openly, as in this statement: 
Following the prosperous development of the socialist
market economy, urban residents’ rice bowl is no
longer iron; adding on other unforeseen events, some
staff and workers’ basic livelihood has met with diffi-
culty. (1)
The main point here is that the incidence of urban indigence
shot sharply upward once state and collective enterprises
were enjoined to cut back drastically on their workforces
after the mid-1990s. At the same time, with the total over-
haul of the socialist economy and its institutions, traditional
welfare entitlements were also taken away, (2) leaving losers
at a total loss. 
In the 1990s, the Chinese leadership became cognizant of
and deeply concerned over these negative social externalities
of marketisation. Most especially, its members agonised over
the potential political impact of these deprivations on its hal-
lowed objectives of social stability and a successful project of
state enterprise reform. For securing these aims was deemed
essential to the grander goal that has undergirded every
undertaking of the post-Mao state: this is the modernity of
the nation, particularly of its metropolises. Accordingly, the
political elite initiated a novel welfare approach to handle
the people most severely affected by economic restructuring
— and therefore those most antithetical to the objective of
smoothly sailing progress. These targeted persons constitute
a category comprised of a never-before so sizable segment of
the city populace: they were newly-minted, state-policy-pro-
voked, dirt-poor urbanites living in the midst of what still
calls itself “socialist China.” 
After a half dozen years of grass-roots experimentation, in
the place of the old urban work-unit-grounded, relatively uni-
versal, automatic security entitlements granted by the enter-
prises in the municipalities of the socialist era, the state inau-
gurated a discretionary, means-tested cash transfer pro-
gram, (3) the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (zuidi
shenghuo baozhang), popularly referenced as the “dibao.” If
not in intent at least in fallout it is much akin to what Tony
Judt has written of “modern welfare reform” in Western set-
tings, in that both introduce “conditionality” into “social cit-
izenship” by forcing the beneficiaries to “pass certain tests
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This paper revises and condenses my paper “The Dibao: A Minimum Livelihood Guarantee to
Guarantee Minimal Commotion,” prepared for Workshop on Comparative Urban Marginaliza-
tion and Poverty, Cardiff, UK, 12-13 June 2008. 
1. Yuan Lanhua and Lin Chengmei, “Ai ru chao yong—Qingdaoshi chengxiang zuidi
shenghuo baozhang zhidu shishi jishi” (Love like a rising tide—a true reporting of the
Qingdao city urban and rural minimum livelihood guarantee system), Zhongguo
minzheng (hereafter ZGMZ), 7 (1998), p. 10.
2. This point appears in an essay on an official website, “Zhongguo chengshi jumin zuidi
shenghuo baozhang biaojun de xiangguan fenxi, jingji qita xiangguan lunwen” (Chinese
urban residents’ dibao norm’s relevant analysis; economic and other related treatises)
(hereafter “Zhongguo chengshi”), unpaged, http://www.ynexam.cn/html/jingjixue/
jingjixiangguan/2006/1105/zhonggochengshijimin, accessed 18 August 2007. The
same point is made by Ya Ping Wang in Urban Poverty, Housing and Social Change in
China, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, 60, pp. 71-87.
3. This term comes from Sarah Cook, “The Challenge of Informality: Perspectives on
China’s changing labour market,” Paper for IDS Bulletin, 2008.
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After the Chinese leadership became cognizant of the negative social externalities of marketization--especially
potential threats to its hallowed objectives of social stability and successful state enterprise reform--it initiated a
novel welfare approach, the dibao, to handle the people most severely affected by economic restructuring. I review
the state’s management of these people and the latter’s experiences. I argue that they are seen subliminally (if not
explicitly) by the elite as a menace to officialdom’s modernization ambition. Hence, the dibao is structured so as to
keep its targets quiet and out of view, now and into the future. 
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and demonstrate appropriate behavior.” (4) Perhaps it is most
surprising to find this practice in a state that for its urban res-
idents was once considerably egalitarian and rather munifi-
cent.
The charge of the dibao was to provide for urban residents
whose household income failed to reach a locally-deter-
mined minimal threshold; the method was to supplement
that income to the extent necessary to bring the family’s
monthly wherewithal up to the level deemed requisite for
basic survival in that region. (5) The project was proudly
labelled by its publicists a “standardised, legalised, social
guarantee system,” (6) a characterisation more aspirational
than actual, especially at the time of the plan’s national
promulgation in September 1999. (7) Much like “reformed”
Western welfare programs, it reeks of distrust of its objects;
unlike similar schemes in democracies, however, its adminis-
trators are ably assisted by the recipients’ co-residents in
their community courtyards.
The idea behind the policy amounted to supplying individu-
als with funds that were “just enough to keep body and soul
together,” in the words of its leading scholar within China,
Tang Jun. (8) Its upshot — intended or not — was to render
the recipients, the dibao duixiang (minimum livelihood guar-
antee targets) or dibaohu (minimum livelihood households)
politically pacified, socially marginalised, and excluded,
silent, and discarded, the effectual detritus of the country’s
modern, metropolitan development. Thus a population
whose plunge in plight was manufactured by a state-spon-
sored market incursion was set to be further manipulated by
the powers-that-be. 
And since the provisions of the program in many ways con-
fine not just the payees but their progeny as well to long-term
penury, operatively ensuring that all be denied any opportu-
nity for upward mobility, it seems fair to see it as a ticket to
membership in a permanent underclass. An irony is that
even as a drive for modernity brought this grouping into
being, these now-paupers — too old, too ignorant, too
unskilled, too unwell (9) — are themselves set to remain as un-
modern dregs of the past, debris of the old, ousted order,
unable to enter the gates to the future, placed thusly, presum-
ably, in the interest of not threatening the nation’s onward
progress. (10) The approach adopted appears to be an excel-
lent way to ensure this result, as it tends to detain most of
the recipients within their domiciles, due both to their bod-
ily weakness and to their sense of shame. They are the anti-
emblem of China’s urban modernisation.
In what follows, I examine the expressed aims of the policy;
quantify the amounts of funds laid out over time; and outline
the procedures for establishing eligibility and disbursing allo-
cations, plus document attendant mishaps, misunderstand-
ings, and misappropriations that attend the implementation
of the program. My sources include 53 recipient families
interviewed in Wuhan in the summer of 2007. (11) The resi-
dents in the communities covered could be questioned
because of personal connections with community officials.
Thus, the “sample” consists simply of those dibaohu mem-
bers found at home who were willing to speak with us. I also
spoke with bureaucrats in charge of the program in Wuhan
and Lanzhou, and with community (shequ) cadres at sever-
al Wuhan community offices. And I read documentary mate-
rial from the journal of the responsible ministry, the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, Zhongguo minzheng (China Civil Affairs);
statistical yearbooks and annual social development “blue
books” published by the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences; and official materials: government work reports,
articles on the Internet, (12) and documents collected in
Wuhan and Lanzhou in August and September 2007.
I draw upon this material to undergird my argument above:
that the thrust of the state’s management over them, along
with the nature of their own experiences, together signify
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4. Tony Judt, “The Wrecking Ball of Innovation,” Review of Robert B. Reich, Supercapital-
ism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life, New York, Knopf,
2007, The New York Review of Books, December 6, 2007, p. 24. 
5. Artar Hussain et al., “Urban poverty in the PRC,” Asian Development Bank Project No.
TAR: PRC 33448. 2002.
6. Ding Langfu, Ding Langfu, Cong danwei fuli dao shehui baozhang—ji zhongguo cheng-
shi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de dansheng” (From unit welfare to social se-
curity—recording the emergence of Chinese urban residents’ minimum livelihood guar-
antee system), ZBMZ 11 (1999), p. 7.
7. For the 1999 Regulations officially announcing the program, see “Chengshi jumin zuidi
shenghuo baozhang tiaoli” (Regulations on the urban residents’ minimum livelihood
guarantee) (hereafter “Chengshi jumin”), ZGMZ 11 (1999), pp. 16-17.
8. The Report of Poverty and Anti-Poverty in Urban China — The Poverty Problems in Urban
China and the Program of Minimum Living Standard,” (hereafter “The Report”), ms.,
2002, p. 4. Portions of the report were later translated and published as Dorothy J.
Solinger, guest editor: Tang Jun, “Selections from Report on Poverty and Anti-Poverty in
Urban China,” Chinese Sociology & Anthropology Winter 2003-4/Spring 2004.
9. Not only were such individuals likely to lose their jobs in the massive shakedown of the
late 1990s and early 2000s, but, lacking skills, they could rarely hope to find new work
(Tang Jun, “Selections,” Chapter Three). “Zhongguo chengshi” reports on an investiga-
tion that found that among adult targets, those with primary education and below rep-
resented 24.1 percent, while 46.5 percent had been to junior high school, together
amounting to 70.6 percent without any senior high school training. A mere 27.6 percent
of these people boasted of having some sort of professional or handicraft skill, while just
2.9 percent claimed to have some work. As for their health, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
announced that in a national study of 10,000 dibao households, 33.7 percent have dis-
abled people, and 64.9 percent had one or more members with a chronic or serious ill-
ness. 
10. The mindset and rationale informing the project evokes the reasoning of Borge Bakken,
The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Moder-
nity in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 59-74 and 433-34.
11. Interviews were in three Wuhan districts, 27-31 August. 
12. I thank Kam Wing Chan for introducing me to a portal on the Web containing a wealth
of official articles.
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that the dibaohu are seen subliminally (if not explicitly) by
the elite as a menace to officialdom’s modernisation ambi-
tion. Hence, a chief repercussion of the dibao’s design is to
keep its targets quiet and out of view, now and into the
future. Sta ted goa ls
The rhetoric of the program — especially its language of
rights and self-reliance — belie its actual outcomes. The
empowering 1999 Regulations proclaim that those house-
holds whose members, living together, have an average per
capita income below that needed for a minimal livelihood
“have the right to obtain material assistance with their basic
livelihood”; they also allege that the policy is meant to
“encourage self-support through labour” (13) (italics added).
Yet little, in fact, appears in the speeches of top leaders — or
in the great majority of pertinent government documents —
about either rights or economic autonomy. Most critically,
the program has to date been administered such that there
is no space for such possibilities. As Tang Jun reported in
2002, “The idea of dibao as a basic right hasn’t penetrated
to the recipients or to society at large yet.” (14)
Soon after then-Premier Zhu Rongji had signed the order
authorising the project in 1997, a Ministry of Civil Affairs
official announced that the Party 15th Congress had autho-
rised the project to “perfect the traditional social relief sys-
tem, establish a wholesome modern social welfare system,
and guarantee that the economic system reform, especially
the state enterprises’ reform, could progress without inci-
dent [shunli jinbu]” (15) (italics added). Once the program
was underway, the Ministry went on to specify that the
measure “relates to whether or not the state’s reform and
opening can penetrate and whether or not the socialist mar-
ket economic system can develop in a healthy manner”; it
also made a point of advising the localities to “spend a lit-
tle money to buy stability.” Zhu Rongji, (16) reportedly an
exponent of the project, visited the poorest of China’s
provinces on the eve of a massive injection of finances into
it, and proclaimed that: “The dibao’s support of social sta-
bility and guarantee of the reform of the state firms has
important significance; we should strengthen it, should fund
it. The centre and various local levels must all gradually
increase its funds each year, and central finance should give
necessary subsidies to places in financial difficulty.” (17)
Thus, the paired objectives of securing stability and facili-
tating the firms’ reform lay at the core of the program’s
promulgation. 
Various urban governments submitted reviews of their areas’
execution of the project repeating these same themes. Fairly
typical was Wuhan’s announcement, unabashedly declaring
the aim as “to help the enterprises throw off their worries
and solve their difficulties” and “to lighten the enterprises’
burdens.” (18) One writer went so far as to refer to the dibao
as a “tranquiliser” that would permit the state enterprises in
Shenyang’s Tiexi District (a site of massive layoffs) to go for-
ward without obstruction. For without it, this essayist
penned, “these people must become a burden that the enter-
prises would find it hard to throw off… to the point of possi-
bly arousing even larger social contradictions.” (19) Thus, as
implementation became reality, the formal language of the
empowering ordinance — with its bow toward the beneficiar-
ies themselves — seems to have been overlooked.
Once the new administration of Premier Wen Jiabao had
gotten underway, concern for the poor became linked to the
new catchword, “harmony,” which in essence could be taken
as a rehashed label for stability. In 2007, a paper in the civil
affairs journal emphasised that “the government demands
that every place guarantee whomever should be guaranteed,
to solve the livelihood problems of the urban poor to realise
social stability” (my italics). (20)
Again, concern for the poor for their own sake is sadly miss-
ing from these pronouncements. But that sentiment is not
altogether absent; it occasionally has appeared in the civil
affairs journal. An outlier has been the director of the
Ministry’s Relief Office, Wang Zhenyao, who in 1996
termed the “issue of appropriately solving urban poor resi-
dents’ livelihood difficulties” “an important task in the coun-
try’s present economic and social development”; he also set
ensuring the people’s right to basic livelihood (jiben
shenghuo quanyi) as in itself “an important component part
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13. “Chengshi jumin, p. 16.
14. Tang Jun, “The Report,” p. 35.
15. Wang Zhikun, “Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang: Buru fazhihua guanli guidao”
(Urban residents’ minimum livelihood guarantee: Step into the orbit of legalized manag-
ment) ZGMZ 11 (1999), p. 18.
16. “Jianli zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de jige wenti” (Several issues in establishing the
minimum livelihood guarantee system), ZGMZ 9 (1996), p. 14.
17. Tang Jun, “Zhongguo chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de tiaoyueshi
fazhan” (The leap forward style of development of Chinese urban residents minimum
livelihood guarantee), in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin, Shehui lanpishu: 2003 nian:
zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Social blue book: 2003 analysis and predictions
of China’s social situation), Beijing, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social science
documents company), 2003, p. 243.
18. Meng Jiawu, “Wuhan chengshi zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de sige tedian” (Four
characteristics of Wuhan city’s minimum livelihood guarantee system), ZGMZ, 7 (1996),
p. 19.
19. Ding Langfu, op. cit., p. 7.
20. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
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of the government’s role.” (21) In short, for most of the pro-
gram’s publicists and practitioners, to become effectively
“reformed” and thus sufficiently modern, China would need
to keep disciplined the new underdogs to which its marketi-
sation had given birth. This it has achieved not by satisfying
but by subduing them.T he  m e cha nics  a nd m one yc onsti tuti ng the  p r ogra m
O per ati on ali si ng  the  p over ty l in e  
The Regulations formalising the system called for setting the
outlays locally, in accord with the costs of the amount of food,
clothing, and housing needed for minimal subsistence in a
particular city. Designers of the program put urban authori-
ties in charge of determining the line, since prices, the pat-
tern of consumption, and the average income per capita vary
geographically. Another reason was that cities were original-
ly to fund at least a portion of the outlay, so a given munici-
pality’s financial capability was critically relevant as well. (22)
The cut-off line, set separately by and for each metropolis
(and its own suburban areas), aims to subsidise households
whose average per capita income falls below the amount nec-
essary for purchasing basic necessities at the prices prevailing
locally. The line was to be set below both the minimum wage
and unemployment insurance benefits, supposedly to encour-
age beneficiaries to accept employment whenever possible.
But this element had a draconian correlate: a recipient’s
acquisition of even a tiny increment in income through occa-
sional labour could result in a drastic reduction of his/her
household’s dibao disbursement, so some (in my sample, one
of 53) did feel disinclined to seek employment.
The bureaus of civil affairs, labour, finance, auditing, person-
nel, statistics, and prices, along with the local branches of
the trade union, jointly stipulate and, when deemed neces-
sary (as in times of inflation, when a city’s financial receipts
have had a good turn or when the standard of living among
the general population of a city has risen), (23) hike up the
local cut-off line. (24) Other departments were given other,
related functions, e.g., the education bureau had to ensure
that the targets’ children’s miscellaneous school fees were
either reduced or cancelled, and medical departments were
to do the same for medical treatment fees. (25) In addition,
most places created a special leadership small group, locat-
ed within the bureau of civil affairs, to take overall control. (26)
All told, the financial situation of the city has a determining
impact upon where the poverty line is set; poorer urban juris-
dictions preferred to set the standard lower from the outset
so as to minimise the numbers for which they would be
responsible, whereas in cities with more revenue and where,
often, the numbers of the poverty-stricken are fewer, the line
is pegged at a higher level. Though initially it was projected
that the costs would be shared relatively equally between the
central government and the localities, in practice the portion
born by localities has varied significantly, from sites where
the city pays the bulk or even all of the allowances (as in the
wealthy coastal region) to places where sizable assistance
from the central government means that a locale bears
almost none of the expenses (in the west). (27)
The authorising regulations divide the recipients into two
types: those who fit the conditions of the old “three with-
outs,” (28) and those with some minimal income. (29) “Three-
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21. Wang Zhenyao and Wang Hui, “Luoshi chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zijin
ying chuli hao wuge guanxi” (In order to implement urban residents’ minimum livelihood
guarantee funds we need to handle five relationships well), ZGMZ 3 (1998), p. 18.
22. The following comes from Artar Hussain et al., “Urban poverty in the PRC,” Asian Develop-
ment Bank Project No. TAR: PRC 33448. 2002, pp. 64-76. Wang Hui,”Chengshi zuidi
shenghuo baozhang gongzuo zhi wo jian” (My opinion on the urban minimum livelihood
guarantee work), ZGMZ, 10 (1996), p. 34, explains the concrete method for setting the line.
23. Some cities routinely raise the line every year or, in the case of Wuhan and some other
places, every two years. Interview, head of the dibao section at the Wuhan Civil Affairs
Bureau, 28 August 2007.
24. “Shishi zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de sikao” (Reflections on implementing the mini-
mum livelihood guarantee system), ZGMZ, 4 (1998), p. 20; the 1999 Regulations stipulated
that the line could only rise, not fall. See Wang Zhikun, Wang Zhikun, “Chengshi jumin zuidi
shenghuo baozhang: Buru fazhihua guanli guidao” (Urban residents’ minimum livelihood
guarantee: Step into the orbit of legalized managment) ZGMZ 11 (1999), pp. 18, 19.
25. Xu Daosheng, “Jiada gongzuo lidu, chengxiang quanmian tuijin—Guangdong sheng
jianli chengxiang hu (cun) min zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de zuofa” (Strengthen
work, carry out fully in the cities and rural areas—Guangdong province establishes a
method for an urban and rural (village) residents’ minimum livelihood guarantee sys-
tem), ZGMZ, 3 (1998), p. 10. The civil affairs departments provide these other offices
with a name list of the dibaohu in their jurisdiction, and it is then up to the offices to pro-
vide the relief. The housing, legal aid, coal, water, and electricity departments have sim-
ilar charges. Interview, Lanzhou, 5 September 2007, with the head of the dibao office
under the Provincial Civil Affairs Department.
26. Mao Jiansheng, “Liguo limin de ningjuli gongcheng—Fan Baojun fubuzhang jiu cheng-
shi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu jianshe hui benkan jizhe wen” (A cohesive
project benefiting the nation and the people—Vice Minister Fan Baojun answers this
journal’s reporter’s questions about the minimum livelihood guarantee system’s con-
struction), ZGMZ, March 1997, p. 5.
27. Wang Zhenyao and Wang Hui, “Luoshi chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zijin ying
chuli hao wuge guanxi” (In order to implement urban residents’ minimum livelihood guar-
antee funds we need to handle five relationships well), ZGMZ 3 (1998), pp. 18, 19. Hus-
sain, op. cit., p. 70, writing in 2002, said that only 21 of the 31 provincial-level units con-
tributed toward the cost of the dibao. But Tang Jun, “The New Situation of Poverty and
Antipoverty,” in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, Li Peilin, et al., ed., 2002 nian: Zhongguo shehui xing-
shi yu yuce (Shehui lanpishu): (Year 2002: Analysis and Forecast of China’s Social Situ-
atiuon (Blue Book on Chinese Society)), January 1, 2002. (FBIS Translated Text) states
that, “With the exception of Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and
Guangdong, all the other provinces got the central government’s financial subsidies.”
28. This term refers to the original the original three welfare targets (those unable to work,
those without means of livelihood, and those without family support).
29. This is the eighth point in the Regulations. For the Regulations, see “Chengshi jumin,”
p. 16.
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without” households or individuals receive the full amount of
funds, up to the city’s poverty line, while households in other
circumstances supposedly get the difference between the
average per capita income in the household and the local
poverty line multiplied by the number of household mem-
bers living together. (30)
In 1995 the State Statistical Bureau estimated that about
24.28 million people could be 
considered indigent, or 8.6 percent of all urban residents, at
a time when the urban population was about 282.3 mil-
lion. (31) But a 2001 report by the Party’s Organisation
Department disclosed that an investigation by the National
Statistical Bureau, the State Council Research Office, and
other units, discovered that, nationwide, 20 to 30 million
staff and workers had fallen into poverty in the previous few
years. With family members included it was judged that alto-
gether these people amounted to 40 to 50 million, (32) or
almost 13 percent of what was considered the urban popula-
tion at that time. 
Given that the maximum number ever served by the pro-
gram after its expansion in 2002 never reached even 23 mil-
lion (though rising from a mere 2.8 million at its inception
in 1999 to 22.7 million in 2007), this could mean that some-
thing like less than half of the country’s truly poor have been
served. Indeed, a study using data from a 2004 Urban
Employment and Social Protection Survey carried out by
the Institute of Population and Labour Economics in CASS
showed that just 39 percent of all poor households were get-
ting the aid of the dibao program. (33) How much funding has
been committed to assisting those beneficiaries? The answer
ought to reveal something about the priority accorded the
project.
40 N o  2 0 0 8 / 4
30. Wang, Urban Poverty, p. 133.
31. Tang Jun, “Selections,” p. 26. His source here is “Wo guo chengzhen jumin pinkunmian
you duoda?” (How large is the scale of poverty in our country?), Zhongguo xinxibao
(China information), 7 March 1997.
32. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu ketizu (Chinese central organization department re-
search group), 2000-2001 Zhongguo diaocha baogao—xin xingshixia renmin neibu
maodun yanjiu (2000-2001 Chinese investigation report—research on internal contra-
dictions within the people under the new situation), Beijing, Zhongyang bianyi chuban-
she (Central Complation & Translation Press), 2001, pp. 170-71.
33. Meiyan Wang, “Emerging Urban Poverty and Effects of the Dibao Program on Alleviating
Poverty in China,” China & World Economy, 15, No. 2, 2007, p. 86.
An elderly Chinese woman collects recyclable items from the trash bins,
selling to make a few Yuan a day, in Beijing. China has spent some billions
of Yuan since 1999 on a social security system for the urban poor that is
shaping up as the basic social security net for city dwellers, but only a half
of urban poor have benefited from the system since it was set up in 1999. 
© AFP
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A mou n ts o f  fu n ds  an d th eir  so ur ces
As the numbers of recipients rose over the years, the amount
of money committed to the program mounted as well.
According to a piece by Tang Jun, in 1999, the year of the
State Council’s promulgation of the program’s Regulations,
the central government allocated over 405 million Yuan, rep-
resenting about 27 percent of that year’s total expenditure of
1.5 billion to the dibao, the remaining portion being doled
out by cities. In the next year, the total outlay doubled to
three billion, of which the central financial contribution
remained at the same percentage. But in 2001, when the
program’s funds reached 4.2 billion, the centre paid out
more than half of the total (55 percent), or 2.3 billion
Yuan. (34)
The year 2002 saw a major jump in the quantity of funds
handed out, amounting to 10.53 billion Yuan, but the centre
gave just 44 percent. (35) Despite this hike in the handouts,
even after extra funding was allocated in 2001 and 2002, an
official report admitted that, as of early 2002, the average
poverty line across all participating urban areas was a mere
152 Yuan per person per month, only 29 percent of 2001’s
average urban per capita income nationwide. (36) In 2003, as
much as 15 billion Yuan was budgeted (of which the centre
dispensed 9.2 billion, over 60 percent).
Regardless of what appears as a new generosity, in that
year the actual average per person subsidy (the per capita
supplement allocated to each person) was just 56 Yuan per
month. (37) By 2005, this average monthly per capita
allowance had risen to 70 Yuan, with a probable annual
total expenditure in the range of 19.5 billion. (38) Even as
disbursements multiplied in Yuan, however, the amount of
the per capita supplement nationwide on average amount-
ed to a piddling 9.2 percent of average urban per capita
income. (39) Two years later, at the end of 2007, when
22.709 million people (amounting to 300,000 people
more than at the same point a year earlier), (40) living in
10,656,000 households, were enjoying the program, the
average monthly poverty line around the country had gone
up to 182.3 Yuan per person, a rise of 12.8 Yuan over the
previous year. At the same time, the average subsidy
nationwide had increased to 102 Yuan per person per
month, 23 percent over 2006 (41) — an amount still less than
16 percent of the average urban income (1,148.83
Yuan). (42)
From a different angle, using Tang Jun’s figures, the funds
allocated to the dibao nationwide each year rose from a
miniscule 0.113 percent of government expenditures in 1999
to a high of just 0.61 percent in 2003 (though dropping in
2006, down to only 0.50 percent). (43) This average was
pulled down by the millions of urbanites residing in smaller
and poorer cities across the nation, where the portions of
relief funding were truly paltry. Still, given the large increas-
es in government revenue over these years, it is notable that
the percentage of funding going to the dibaohu did not
exhibit a greater rise over time, and that the numbers served
remained relatively fixed around 22 million after 2002. It is
hard to imagine that the households so aided could survive
with any degree of satisfaction. It is also striking that the
nourishment, educational, and health standards among the
individual dibaohu have remained remarkably unchanged
and essentially abysmal over the years, as documented by a
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34. Tang Jun, “Jianli zonghe de zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu” (Establish a comprehen-
sive minimum livelihood guarantee system), http://thjp.vip.sina.com/M.htm, accessed
on 18  March 2008. Hussain, op. cit., 70 has different figures: he states that the total
expenditure in 1999 was just 1.97 billion Yuan, and 2.2 billion in 2000, of which the cen-
tral government contributed 20.3 percent and 24.1 percent, respectively. Since I must
make a choice, I intend to base my analysis on Tang’s figures, since he is in Beijing per-
manently and works closely with official figures on an ongoing basis.
35. 4.6 billion Yuan came from the central treasury and 5.93 billion from local governments.
Xinhuanet (Beijing), 19 July 2002. Thanks to Jane Duckett for this citation. 
36. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
37. Tang Jun, “Jiasu zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de guifanhua yunzuo” (Speed up the
standardization of the minimum livelihood guarantee system), in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and
Li Peilin (eds.), Shehui lanpishu: 2004 nian: zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (So-
cial blue book: 2004 analysis and predictions of China’s social situation), Beijing, She-
hui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social science documents company), 2004, pp. 117-18.
Another source states that the average norm in 2003 nationwide was 149 per capita per
month, which had increased to 162, on average, by the third quarter of 2006, with the
supplement rising from 58 to 80 Yuan per capita per month, on average, over those
three years (See “Zhongguo jianli chengxiang shehui jiuzhu tixi 7 qianwan kunnan qun-
zhong ganshou wennuan yangguang” (China constructs an urban-rural social relief sys-
tem, 70 million masses in difficulty feel warm sunshine), http://china.com.cn/txt/2006-
11/30/content_7429928.htm.
38. Tang Jun, “Tiaozhengzhong de chengxiang zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu” (The urban
and rural minimum livelihood guarantee system in adjustment), in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and
Li Peilin (eds.), Shehui lanpishu: 2004 nian: zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (So-
cial blue book: 2006 analysis and predictions of China’s social situation), Beijing, She-
hui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social science documents company), 2006, pp. 165,
167.
39. Ibid., 168.
40. “China’s subsistence allowance system benefits urban, rural poor equally,” accessed 24
January 2008, at http://english.people.com.con/90001/90776/6344770.html.
41. “National urban and rural residents, the minimum livelihood guarantee system for equal
coverage,” accessed 18 March 2008 at http://64.233.179.104/translate_c?
hl=en&sl=zh-CN&u=http://jys.ndrc.gov.cn/xinxi/t20080.
42. According to Premier Wen Jiabao’s annual government work report, delivered on 5
March 2008, the average annual per capita income for urbanites in 2007 was 13,786
Yuan, one twelfth of which (or the monthly average) is 1148.33 Yuan. The report can be
found at http://www.china.org.cn/government/NPC_CPPCC_sessions2008/2008-
03/18/content_12 (accessed 14 April 2008).
43. Calculations are based upon the figures for governmental expenditure in Zhonghua ren-
min gongheguo guojia tongjiju bian (Chinese People’s Republic national statistical bureau,
ed., 2007 Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe (China Statistics Press), p. 279. Hussain, op. cit., p. 71, states that in 1999 the
expenditure on the dibao amounted to 0.15 percent of total government expenditure.
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comparison of Tang Jun’s research team’s field notes from
the late 1990s with my own interview material from 2007. (44)
Ot her  su bs id ies
In addition to the handout of cash, the dibao program pro-
vides special privileges for recipients, involving discounts or
exemptions. Wuhan, to give one example, offered as many
as 12 separate youhui zhengce (preferential policies) as of
mid-2007, including reductions in rent and in the charges for
water, food, electricity, fuel, and legal services, as well as
freedom from paying medical registration and miscellaneous
school fees, in addition to various subsidies. The city boast-
ed of furnishing two more such policies than Beijing did. (45)
Far from all of my informants received these benefits, how-
ever; indeed, some had never even heard of them.
In 2007, a number of new appropriations were made, some
locally and some centrally mandated. An example of the lat-
ter was a one-time bonus for coping with sudden spurts in
the prices of pork and other food products, the amount dis-
pensed to be determined by individual cities, (46) and a pro-
gram to aid students in vocational middle schools. (47) Some
municipalities set aside funds for the children of dibao fam-
ilies who were attending college. (48) One district in
Guangzhou distributed certificates permitting dibaohu to
purchase 20 Yuan worth of goods, (49) while Wuhan allowed
poor university students from dibao households to apply for
educational loans. (50) And the State Council authorised a
low-income housing program, aimed especially at families
living in financial hardship. (51) To get a better sense of how
the program operates on the ground, it is necessary to exam-
ine the official procedures and the pitfalls often entailed in
pursuing them.Pr oce dure s  a nd the ir  p itfa ll s
Pr oced ur es
The workaday execution of the program plainly doles out
disgrace to its targets. Its urban management splits discretion
among four levels: the city, the district, the street, and the
“community” (shequ), a unit that replaced and absorbed
several residence committees each in the early 2000s. All
these jurisdictions share in reporting, registering, investigat-
ing, approving, issuing forms, making modifications, and fil-
ing cases. (52) The province also has a role: along with the city
and the county it formulates local policy, dispenses propa-
ganda, and organises supervisory work. County and district
civil affairs departments take charge of implementing the sys-
tem within their areas, look into and approve applications,
and issue certificates; the street offices handle registration,
while serving as a lower-level examiner of cases; and the res-
idents’ committee (the community), which — situated among
the families’ homes, and staffed by individuals closely famil-
iar with the target population — takes in the cases and per-
forms the initial check-up and all subsequent reporting. (53)
Applicants’ journey toward becoming recipients begins with
a written entreaty, accompanied by documentary proof of
their penury, to be submitted to the community office in
charge. After filing the request, community officials have a
certain amount of time (set locally, usually from five to ten
days) to assess the candidate’s needs and to attempt to veri-
fy the paperwork presented. Certification of a claimant’s
qualification can be a particularly invasive process, beginning
with a thorough physical search of the household in ques-
tion, along with close inquiry of its members. What follows
is an alarmingly intrusive, sometimes even insidious, proce-
dure, involving interviewing neighbours and visiting the can-
didate’s place of work — if any — to make sure the applicant
has spoken truthfully. Most embarrassing of all, the results of
the scrutiny are to be posted upon a public board (the gong-
shilan) set in the midst of the community’s common grounds,
in order to solicit the views not just of immediate neighbours
but of everyone in the community acquainted with the appli-
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44. Tang Jun’s notes are in “Selections”; mine are available upon request.
45. Interview, Wuhan dibao office, 28 August 2007.
46. “Youyu roujia dafu shangzhang, Hefei dibao duixiang mei ren huo 90 yuan butie” (Be-
cause of the large rise in pork prices, Hefei dibao recipients will each get a subsidy of
90 yuan), Jianghuai chenbao (Jianghuai morning paper), http://politics.people.com.cn/
GB/14562/6075338.html, accessed 6 August 2007.
47. “Xiangshou chengshi dibao zhengce jiating de zhongzhi xuesheng ke lingqu zhuxuejin”
(Students in middle vocational schools whose families enjoy the urban dibao policy can
get funds to help with schooling), Xinhuawang, 18 July 2007.
48. “Dibao jiating zinu shang daxue jiuzhujin tigaole” (The relief funds for the sons and
daughters of dibao families who are going to college), Zhongguo Ezhou zhengfu menhu
wangzhan (China Ezhou government portal website), 8 August 2007.
49. “Guangzhoushi Liwanqu dibaohu meiyue ke huode 20 yuan tihuoquan” (Guangzhou
city’s Liwan district’s dibao households each month can get 20 yuan of goods certifi-
cates), Guangzhou ribao, 18 August 2007, accessed 20 August 2007, at http://news.xin-
huanet.com/local/2007-08/18/content_6556887.htm.
50. “Wuhan huji pinkun daxuesheng kaishi shenqing shengyuandi xinyong zhuxue daikuan”
(Wuhan registered poor university students can begin to apply for credit loans for school
assistance at the student’s [home] locality), Changjiang ribao (Yangzi daily), 2 Septem-
ber 2007.
51. “Shouquan fabu: Guwuyuan guanyu jiejue chengshi dishouru jiating zhufang kunnan de
ruogan yijian” (Authorized announcement: Some opinions on the State Council’s solving
urban low-income families’ housing difficulty), Xinhuawang, 13 August 2007,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-08/13/content_6526964.htm, accessed on 14
August 2007.
52. Laid out in Meng Jiawu, op. cit.
53. Xu Daosheng, op. cit., p. 10.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
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cant family’s true state of eligibility, and of everyone in a
position to see the targeted family members’ daily comings
and goings. (54) Communities managing the system as they
are ordered to do use the board to proclaim how many mem-
bers live in every payee household; how much money each
one is receiving; what special subsidies it is being given; and
how much “voluntary work” (such as neighbourhood sanita-
tion, public security, guarding, or gardening) its relevant
members performed in a given week, such activity being a
necessary condition of enjoying the allowance, so long as
one is physically able. (55)
Once the community officers have made their tentative
appraisal of a case, the file goes up to the street level, where
another week or so is spent reviewing the materials. Street
officials’ deliberations are also posted publicly on the com-
munity’s board for neighbours’ comments. After the same
length of time has passed, the records are delivered to the
district level, where managers do a re-examination. The
judgments about those who so far have seemed to meet the
necessary conditions must once again be subjected to yet
one more humiliating public view and reaction. If and only
if there are no objections from other residents, finally the
City Civil Affairs Bureau gives its stamp of approval, and the
candidate becomes a full-fledged “dibaohu.”
Families accepted are then extended a “baozhangjin
lingquzheng” (certificate for collecting the funds), which
their head is to carry, along with his/her household registra-
tion booklet and identification card to claim the allowance
from the bank, either monthly or by quarter, depending
upon the method adopted in their community. Subsequent,
regular inspections (sometimes as frequent as every three
months, in other cases just every six (56)) are meant to certify
that the family remains qualified to enjoy the subsidy. When
a household’s situation or income undergoes alterations
(through a retirement, a death in the family, a new odd job,
or health changes), the household head is to notify the rele-
vant office in its community to arrange for stopping, reduc-
ing, or increasing its outlays. (57)
There are conspicuous variations in the approaches taken by
different municipalities in administering the dibao. In a
1998-99 investigation of implementation in five cities, Tang
Jun and his research group found that Lanzhou was employ-
ing a more mobilisational approach to its indigent than was
Wuhan. Officials in Lanzhou “emphasised arousing the
dibao targets’ activism for production, encouraging and
organising them to develop self-reliance.” (58) Walking
through Wuhan’s streets after 2000, I discovered that
nowhere in the city could shoe repair specialists be found
operating outside, apparently banned by the authorities.
And as of 2007 these cities plainly displayed a persistent
divergence in administrative methods, with Lanzhou clearly
offering its indigent more leniency for their sidewalk busi-
ness than Wuhan. That year I encountered a talented but
hard-up woman in Wuhan who complained that the fees for
exhibiting her artwork on the streets had escalated substan-
tially over time, until she was forced to abandon any effort
to try to make sales. (59)
But in Lanzhou, all manner of curbside business was going
on unobstructed, including stalls for fixing footwear as well
as bunches of young men hawking political picture
posters. (60) In line with these observed differences, the sec-
tion chief of the dibao office in the Gansu provincial civil
affairs department, situated in Lanzhou, admitted that “if
the chengguan” — (the police in charge of maintaining order
in public spaces — the very same body that has often chased
poor and unemployed persons off the avenues of Wuhan) —
“is too strict, the dibaohu cannot earn money. And letting
them earn money is a way of cutting down their numbers. If
their skill level is low, their only means of livelihood can be
the streetside stalls they set up themselves.” (61) So it would
seem that treatment of the targets in different municipalities
can vary in notable ways, with critical consequences for poor
peoples’ income. Wuhan, emphasising beautiful, unencum-
bered thoroughfares, is the quintessential upwardly mobile
“modernising” town, while Lanzhou seems to be prioritising
providing its poor with a chance at prospering a little bit, if
possible.
P itfa lls  an d di sen tit l emen t:  Exc lu si on sa n d embezz lemen ts
The stated good intentions of the dibao program conceal two
sorts of perverse outcomes, both producing ongoing rock-bot-
tom destitution. The first sort often ends up denying funding
to truly needy people. This can result from local regulations
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54. Interview with officers at community W, an area with about 1,600 residents, of whom
only about one percent are dibaohu, on 30 August 2007.
55. Interviews at community Y containing over 4,000 people, and community Z, both on 29
August 2007.
56. Interview with the director of the dibao office at the Gansu Provincial Civil Affairs De-
partment, 5 September 2007.
57. Wang Zhikun, op. cit., p. 19. Interview with dibao workers at community X, where there
are 1,099 households, of which 7.9 percent are dibaohu, 27 August 2007.
58. Tang Jun, “The Report,” p. 25.
59. Interview 2, 26 August 2007.
60. Observations, 3 September 2007.
61. Interview, 5 September 2007, Lanzhou.
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that dictate the exclusion of persons who try in any way to
upgrade a totally minimal existence, thereby consigning
them and their offspring to a perpetual underclass. Similar
in effect are practices that treat poor people “as if” they had
payments coming to them that ought to have come but have
not, again disqualifying appropriately indigent citizens from
receiving the allowance. These sorts of prohibitions amount
to marginalisation via state — even if just local state or local
officials’ — design.
The other sort of unintended outcome is one that evidently
occurs sufficiently frequently as to be inveighed against in
official documents and in informal conversation with pro-
gram managers. This is an effect that arises as implementa-
tion leaves open channels for embezzlement, deception, and
defrauding, usually on the part of the officials in charge, but
also sometimes — how often is impossible to document — on
the part of the program’s participants. These behaviours
achieve marginalisation by subversion of state design. But
whether by means of dictates or by their debasement, both
categories of activity achieve disentitlement.
Exc lu s ion s :  Mar gin al is atio n  v ia s tatedes ign
The primary strategy cities use to bar seemingly deserving
beneficiaries from the program — one mode of keeping them
marginal (though perhaps not consciously so calculated) — is
to disallow the dibao for households whose behaviour might
help them ascend out of poverty. Ji’nan, for instance, ruled
in August 2007 that anyone who had purchased a computer
or who often uses a cell phone could not enjoy the dibao. (62)
Beijing’s regulations preclude persons who have bought cell
phones, have arranged for their children to attend schools of
their own choice or private schools, or keep any domestic
pets. In Liaoning, using a household phone more than 15
percent more than the local dibao norm or even having
received gifts whose value was above the poverty line dis-
qualified potential partakers. In Hainan, having births out-
side the plan can disqualify an otherwise needy house-
hold. (63) Some places banned people from becoming recipi-
ents if they had a family business, regardless of its profits or
losses — even owning a firm losing money and incapable of
supporting the family’s livelihood could spark quarrels
between civil affairs departments and an applicant. (64)
In Wuhan, the following circumstances could deprive the
destitute of succour: having a motorised vehicle (unless it
was required because of disability); having electrical fees
surpassing 15 Yuan per month, except in the high-heat
months of July, August, and September, or phone fees
beyond 40 Yuan per month; using a cell phone or other
hand-held communication device (even if having obtained it
as a gift or a loan); accessing the Web on a home comput-
er; or “without reason raising hell and influencing public
affairs, maltreating and threatening work personnel.”
Obviously, the final restriction can be loosely interpreted, so
that anyone challenging a decision of the dibao administra-
tors — even anyone who does meet the specifications —
could be thrown off the rolls. (65)
Also forbidden was arranging for a child to enrol in special
classes for study or training; doing odd jobs for which the
wages are hard to verify; or for a child to be studying with a
foreigner. At least some grantees took that guideline serious-
ly, as evinced in this quotation of a mother of a 16-year-old
boy: 
This year his grades could qualify him to transfer to
the Number 3 Senior High School, a provincial-level
keypoint institution. But I don’t have the money and
secondly, if it’s discovered that there’s a child in the
family who has transferred to a keypoint high school,
our dibao qualification would be eliminated. We can’t
take this risk. He really wants to study in that school,
but he knows the family’s conditions, so he doesn’t
demand it of me; I feel I have really let my son
down. (66)
All these strictures condemn the poor to persisting in pover-
ty, while keeping them from mixing into the wider and mod-
ernising society.
The “as if” ostracisations achieve the same purpose — reduc-
ing a locality’s financial responsibility while locking the
socially and physically lame outside the pale — if by other
means. This style of work is justified thus: “Since household
income is very difficult to determine, hidden employment is
pervasive, and hidden income and assets [are known to
exist], [so] flexible standards are adopted everywhere.” (67)
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62. “Jinan guiding maidiannao jingchang yongshoujizhe buneng xiangshou dibao” (Jinan
regulates that those who bought a computer or often use a cell phone can’t enjoy the
dibao), Zhongguowang, 9 October 2006, china.com.cn, accessed 17 August 2007.
63. “Hainan guiding piaochang ji weifan jihua shengyuzhe bu de xiangshou dibao” (Hainan
regulate that those who visiting prostitutes and violate birth planning cannot enjoy
dibao), Zhongguowang, 4 September 2006, china.com.cn
64. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
65. Interview at Community X, 27 August 2007.
66. Interview 6.
67. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
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According to this logic, families are sometimes rejected sim-
ply because their municipality has managed to reduce the
funds it must allocate to the dibao by lowering its local pover-
ty line, thereby cutting off families that need to be assisted. 
Some urban administrators first determine the amount of
funds they are willing to assign to the program and then set
the number of dibaohu accordingly. The most common con-
trary practice is to eliminate people with the ability to work
who have not found employment by considering that they
have received the wages they would have earned had they
been on a job. Such reckoning “regards as income” salary or
benefits that, properly speaking, ought to have been — but
were not — paid to a person, using their city’s minimum
wage or unemployment insurance subsidy to assess the
amount of the supposedly received income or benefit, and
then treating that sum as if it were the person’s actual
income. (68) Another variant is to count as part of a person’s
income the funds that his/her legal supporter ought to be
giving him or her, even if s/he never really gets it. (69)
Still, several interviewees in Wuhan found their families’
dibao funds cut back or cut off when a member did take on
some wage-earning work. In one case a wife’s street-sweep-
ing led to deductions that left four people to survive on some
500-plus Yuan per month. (70) In another, the wife in a fami-
ly of three bravely reflected:
We can still go on, use the dibao money to raise our
son (then age 12) — each month we get a subsidy of
234 Yuan. Though it’s not much, some is always bet-
ter than nothing. The family has one person working,
so the subsidy was lowered a lot. We’re not thinking
of arguing about it, we all are very submissive people,
so we don’t think of bickering over money. If you give
us 200-plus Yuan it still can be of use. (71)
A third woman, aged 34, lamented, “People like us are at
the age for working, but we have no skill or culture, basical-
ly can’t find any good job.” The questioner, pointing out that
her husband had left town in search of odd jobs (dagong),
and that she was managing a stall, inquired whether their
monthly quota had therefore been decreased. “Yes,” she
replied, continuing:
It’s a no-way affair [mei banfa de shiqing]. “In my stall
in one month I can earn only so much money, his work
also isn’t stable, but now our work is calculated into
our income, then they have to cut the subsidy. But this
income fluctuates, sometimes we have it and some-
times we don’t. Only relying on the dibao, that little
money, means that basically there’s no way to live.” (72)
E mbez zl emen t a nd  oth er vi ola tion s :Ma rg in ali sa tion  via  su bver s ion  of  sta ted esig n
More concealed than the practices detailed above — which
are rationalised by resort to local regulations (though criti-
cised in central-level documents and articles) — are outright
violations of the policy, committed by parties on both sides.
First of all, administrators may not receive the funds they
should, quite likely because some of the money disappears
along the way down the hierarchy to their offices. As one
analyst expressed it, “there’s a black box” containing the
intermediary links set up to allocate the capital. (73) In places
with real financial shortages, provincial treasuries appropri-
ate some of the funds for other purposes. (74) In the poorest,
most backward places, preferential policies often are not
observed; even where funds are sufficient, departments that
should make the mandatory discounts do not find it in their
financial interest to comply. (75)
Dereliction of duty can take other forms, too, such as play-
ing favourites among target families. (76) According to one
report, just as with any allocation of funds in China today,
there are management personnel who, in reporting upward
and approving applicants’ files, “don’t take an impartial
standpoint to reflect the true situation but use their public
office for private gain, give priority to their own friends and
relatives, use the dibao to exchange favours, or take the
state’s money and put it into their own personal accounts.” (77)
And one study found that on average families actually obtain
36.5 Yuan less than is reported to upper levels to have been
distributed. (78) These stratagems keep the deck stacked
against the deserving.
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68. “Chengshi dibao: Tashang xin zhengcheng” (The urban dibao: step onto a new journey),
ZGMZ 1 (2000), pp. 24-5.
69. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
70. Interview 8. 
71. Interview 11.
72. Interview 12.
73. Tang Jun, “Zhongguo chengshi,” p. 247.
74. Tang Jun, “The New Situation.”
75. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
76. “Chengshi jumin,” p. 17.
77. Gong Guozheng, “Dibao” zhong de jizhong cuowu renshi” (Several kinds of mistaken un-
derstandings in the dibao) ZGMZ 4 (2000), p. 34.
78. “Zhongguo chengshi.”
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There are instances of dishonesty among the targets, too.
According to journal articles, some dibaohu falsely report
their income, forge documentary evidence, or otherwise
conceal their earnings or assets. This is surely true in some
instances. But it was striking how close the per capita
income was that many Wuhan respondents revealed to us.
These so similar self-reports would seem to suggest that
those informants willing to disclose their monthly intake
were telling us the truth. 
Civil affairs essayists often criticised what they depict as
“mistaken thinking” among the beneficiaries. This entails
“tak[ing] the responsibility they themselves should bear and
push[ing] it off to society and to the government,” demand-
ing, for example, that the state give their elderly parent a
supplement, even when there are five or six siblings who
could shoulder the burden. Others “of strong body” “refuse
to use their two hands to work but instead play cards all day,
out of love of ease and hatred for work,” or so it is claimed. 
Then there are those who, lacking the proper qualifications,
view the dibao as a basic right, or want it just because oth-
ers have it, “stretching out their hands” under the supposi-
tion that everyone should get a share. Yet others, just
because they have been laid off, believe they naturally
deserve the allowance, whether they have a job or not, and
even if they have an adequate source of income. (79) One
Wuhan community leader inveighed against residents in ill
health whose necessary outlays go beyond their means, but
who fail to comprehend that the dibao is based on income,
not on a household’s mandatory expenditures, and thus is
not geared to help people meet all their costs. Alluding to
“dingzihu,” or troublemakers, she complained of “residents
who create unusual difficulties,” such as those who “clearly
don’t fit the criteria for getting the dibao but still press for
it,” often “run[ing] about shouting verbal threats.” (80) It
would seem that the city might find the funds to absorb such
malcontents into the fold, thereby rendering their existence
less terribly bitter.Concl usio n
The dibao program was admittedly put into place to do noth-
ing more than meet the most minimal requirements of the
targeted needy. Its recipients were to be kept alive but
muted, in the interest of rendering China modern without
their interference, whether that interference might transpire
out on the roadways as they eke out an unsightly sustenance
or whether they otherwise venture outside to rail. Above all,
they were not to disturb the forward march of the nation
onward toward progress, which their uncultured and unwell
persons seemed prone to sully. 
Perhaps without actively and specifically intending to mould
their situation in this way, the state has dealt with these
dibaohu in a manner that keeps them and their children
either sickly and therefore off the streets or else insufficient-
ly schooled to advance in society, out of work, and eating too
little to grow strong. And those able to improve their
prospects by providing extra education for their children or
by using computers, or to brighten their existence by commu-
nicating on cell phones or by seeking entertainment, become
for these reasons ineligible. No leader of the country would
be apt to acknowledge the playing out of this subtext. But I
have demonstrated that both the regulations that shape this
program and the regimens used in enforcing it — whether by
design or by subterfuge — marginalise the most indigent
among the urbanites. As they do so, they succeed in forging
what for China is an unaccustomed — if mostly invisible —
underclass, plus purely pristine, and seemingly totally unsul-
lied, modern, “civilised” cities.•
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79. Gong Guozheng, “Dibao zhong de jizhong cuowu renshi” (Several kinds of mistaken un-
derstandings in the dibao) ZGMZ 4 (2000).
80. Interview, Community V.
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